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On the Existence of an Equilibrium in Models of Local Public 
Good Use by Cities to Attract the Creative Class 
Abstract 
We analyze a stylized model of competition between two cities that use a local public good 
(LPG) to attract members of the creative class. The creative class consists of artists and engineers 
and we study the behavior of a representative artist and an engineer. The level of the LPG in each 
city is determined by majority voting of the two representative creative class members. If both 
representative members choose to live in the same city then the LPG provision is the average of 
the preferred quantities of the two members. In this setting, we perform three tasks. First, we 
ascertain the preferred quantity of the LPG for the representative artist and the engineer. Second, 
assuming that the representative artist and the engineer accurately predict the outcome of living in 
a particular city, we describe a scenario in which there is no equilibrium in our model. Finally, we 
show that if the representative artist and the engineer treat the LPG provision levels in each city as 
exogenous then an equilibrium does exist in the model.  
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 Regional scientists and urban economists are both very familiar with two notions that have 
been introduced into the literature by the urbanist Richard Florida. The first is the notion of the 
creative class and the second is the notion of creative capital. The creative class, according to 
Florida (2002, p. 68), is composed of “people who add economic value through their creativity.” 
This class is made up of specialists such as doctors, engineers, lawyers, scientists, university 
professors, and, markedly, bohemians such as artists, musicians, and sculptors. What distinguishes 
members of the creative class from other people---who are not members of the creative class---is 
the fact that they possess creative capital which is postulated to be the “intrinsically human ability 
to create new ideas, new technologies, new business models, new cultural forms, and whole new 
industries that really [matter]” (Florida, 2005, p. 32).  
 From the standpoint of the economic development of cities and regions, what is special 
about the creative capital possessing members of the creative class? In his copious writings on this 
question, Florida (2002, 2003, 2008, 2014), Florida et al. (2017), and some of Florida’s supporters 
such as Stolarick et al. (2011) and Lobo et al. (2014) have argued that city and regional planners 
ought to focus seriously on the activities of the creative class because the collection of people 
making up this class gives rise to ideas, information, and technology, outputs that are salient for 
the growth and development of cities and regions. Put differently, cities and regions that want to 
flourish in this age of globalization need to do all they can to draw in and then hold on to members 
of this creative class who are, for all intents and purposes, the primary drivers of economic growth 
and development. 
 One question that economists---see Glaeser (2005)---have raised when pondering the 
concept of creative capital is the following: What is the difference between the well-known and 
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time-honored notion of human capital and Florida’s newer concept of creative capital? The recent 
work of Batabyal and Beladi (2016, 2018) and that of Batabyal et al. (2019) is pertinent in 
answering this important question. These researchers have helpfully explained that there is little 
or no difference between the notions of human and creative capital when the accretion of this 
creative capital is contingent on the successful completion of many years of formal education. In 
contrast, there can be a lot of difference between the concepts of human and creative capital when 
creative capital is either present naturally or when it is based on the accretion of business and 
professional experiences but not on the successful completion of a formal education.  
 The discussion in the preceding paragraph tells us that creative capital is of two types. 
Therefore, as pointed out by Porter and Batabyal (2016), it is a more general concept than the 
mainly formal instruction based notion of human capital. Batabyal and Beladi (2018) and Batabyal 
et al. (2019) refer to members of the creative class who have creative capital either naturally or 
mostly by collecting business and professional experiences as artists and to those whose 
acquisition of creative capital is the outcome of many years of formal instruction as engineers. 
This bipartite classification---also see Marlet and van Woerkens (2007)---implies that the 
aggregate creative class in either a city or more generally a region is the sum of the artists and the 
engineers in this city or region. We shall make use of this two-part classification of the creative 
class in the ensuing analysis in this chapter.  
 We now concentrate on cities specifically in the remainder of this chapter. In this context, 
suppose one accepts Florida’s (2002) basic point that cities that would like to flourish 
economically need to draw in and then hold on to members of the creative class. The obvious next 
question is: “How are cities to do this?” Florida (2002, 2008), Buettner and Janeba (2016), and 
Batabyal et al. (2019) have responded to this question by explaining that local public goods (LPGs) 
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such as cultural amenities, quality schools, and public transit are a key means by which cities can 
efficaciously carry out the dual “draw in” and “hold on to” functions.4  
 The idea mentioned at the end of the preceding paragraph about the usefulness of LPGs is 
now recognized by researchers. Even so, we would like to emphasize the following two points. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, Batabyal et al. (2019) is the only paper to have conducted a 
theoretical analysis of the effect that the provision of LPGs by two cities has on their ability to 
draw in and hold on to members of the creative class.5 However, to conduct their analysis and 
obtain concrete results, these researchers work with a model with (i) linear functional forms, and 
(ii) actual numbers for many of the model variables. Therefore, the results obtained by these 
researchers in their paper are specific and we know relatively little about the existence of an 
equilibrium in theoretical models in which two cities use LPGs to compete with each other to draw 
in and hold on to members of the creative class. Second and given this lacuna in the literature, our 
goal in this chapter is to provide the first analysis of some of the circumstances that determine 
when an equilibrium does and does not exist in models of LPG use by two cities to attract and 
retain members of the creative class.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our stylized 
model of an aggregate economy that consists of two cities. We use this model to analyze 
competition between the two cities when each city uses a LPG to draw in members of the creative 
class. As pointed out previously, the creative class consists of artists and engineers and we 
concentrate on the behavior of a representative artist and a representative engineer. The amount 
 
4  
See Hansen and Niedomysl (2009), Richardson (2009), and Audretsch and Belitski (2013) for a discussion of related issues. 
5  
For theoretical studies of other questions about the creative class, the reader should consult Batabyal (2017a, 2017b), Batabyal and 
Beladi (2016), Batabyal and Nijkamp (2016), Batabyal and Yoo (2018), and Usman and Batabyal (2014). That said, we stress that 
there is no overlap between the topics we study in this chapter and the questions analyzed in these cited journal articles.  
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of the LPG that is provided in each city is determined by majority voting of the two representative 
creative class members. If both representative members choose to live in the same city then the 
LPG provision is the average of the preferred quantities of these two members. Section 3 ascertains 
the preferred quantity of the LPG for the representative artist and the engineer. Assuming that the 
representative artist and the engineer accurately predict the outcome of living in a particular city, 
section 4 describes a scenario in which there is no equilibrium in the model under study. Section 
5 demonstrates that if the representative artist and the engineer treat the LPG provision levels in 
each city as exogenous or given then an equilibrium does exist in the model. Finally, section 6 
concludes and then suggests four ways in which the research delineated in this chapter might be 
extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework  
Consider an aggregate economy that consists of two cities denoted by the superscript 𝑖 =1, 2. Real world examples from the United States of the kind of cities we have in mind are (i) 
Rochester and Syracuse in the state of New York, (ii) Minneapolis and Saint Paul in the state of 
Minnesota, and (iii) Dallas and Fort Worth in the state of Texas. Our analysis focuses on the 
creative class, i.e., on the sum of the artists and the engineers, in the two cities. Rather than model 
the entire creative class in a city, for expositional ease, in the remainder of this chapter, we shall 
focus on the behavior of a representative artist and a representative engineer. The superscript 𝑘 =𝑎, 𝑒 denotes these two representative creative class members. Specifically, "𝑎" denotes the 
representative artist and "𝑒" denotes the representative engineer. The utilities or payoffs 




See Hindriks and Myles (2013, pp. 555-558) for a textbook exposition of such functions. 
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   𝑈 = 1 − 𝑇 + 𝛽 log 𝐿 , 𝑘 = 𝑎, 𝑒,    (1) 
where 𝑈  denotes the 𝑘𝑡ℎ representative member’s utility, 𝑇  denotes the tax levied by city 𝑖 (=1, 2) to pay for the LPG 𝐿  provided in this city, 𝛽  is a representative member specific parameter, 
and we assume that the inequality 𝛽 > 𝛽 > 0 holds. In words, this assumption means that 
relative to artists, engineers place a higher value on the LPG on offer in each of the two cities.7 
The amount of the LPG provided in each city is determined by majority voting of the two 
representative creative class members (artist and the engineer). If a particular city happens to draw 
in both representative creative class members, then we suppose that the supply of the LPG in this 
city is given by the average of the preferred quantities of the two representative members. With 
this description of our aggregate economy of two cities out of the way, our next task is to ascertain 
the preferred quantity of the LPG for the representative artist and the engineer. 
3. Preferred Levels of the LPG 
 Suppose that there are 𝑛  residents in city 𝑖. Then the tax 𝑇  levied by city 𝑖 when 
representative member 𝑘 selects LPG level 𝐿  is given by 𝐿 𝑛 .⁄  In symbols, we have 𝑇 = 𝐿 𝑛 .⁄  
Substituting this expression for the tax in equation (1), the 𝑘𝑡ℎ representative member’s utility 
function can be written as 
 
    𝑈 = 1 − + 𝛽 log .      (2) 
 
As pointed out by Hindriks and Myles (2013, pp. 208-209), a LPG is typically not a pure public 
good because exclusion is frequently possible. One kind of exclusion arises from the fact that in 
 
7  
There is a precedent for this assumption in the extant literature. See Batabyal et al. (2019) for additional details. 
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order to enjoy a LPG, an individual must be resident in a particular geographical area. In addition, 
a resident individual who refuses to pay local taxes that fund the provision of a LPG can also be 
excluded from enjoying the benefits of the relevant LPG. What this means in our case is that the 
last term in the utility function on the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (2) is appropriately written 
as log 𝐿 𝑛⁄  and not as log(𝐿 ). 
 To determine the preferred value of 𝐿 , we solve 
 
    𝑚𝑎𝑥 1 − + 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 .     (3) 
 
The first-order necessary condition for an optimum is  
 
    − = 0,        (4) 
 
which tells us that the preferred level of the LPG that we seek is given by8 
    𝐿 = 𝛽 𝑛 .        (5) 
Inspecting equation (5), it is easy to confirm that if either the parameter 𝛽  or the number of 
residents in city 𝑖 or 𝑛  increases then the 𝑘𝑡ℎ representative member’s preferred level of the LPG 
also increases. Now suppose that the representative artist and the engineer accurately predict the 
outcome of living in a particular city. Given this supposition, our next task is to delineate a situation 




It is straightforward to verify that the second-order sufficiency condition in this maximization problem is satisfied. 
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4. Non-Existence of an Equilibrium  
 Some thought ought to convince the reader that only two types of equilibria are possible in 
the model that we are studying. In the first or “type I” equilibrium, the representative artist and the 
engineer choose to reside in separate cities and in the second or “type II” equilibrium, the 
representative artist and the engineer both choose to reside in the same city. Now recall from the 
discussion in section 2 that the level of the LPG provided in each city is determined by majority 
voting of the representative artist and the engineer.  
 Therefore, accounting for this voting and the possibility that either the representative artist 
or the engineer may, in principle, want to move to the other city, the utilities obtained by the two 
agents in our model in the first or type I equilibrium are given in Table 1. To interpret the payoffs  
[Table 1 about here] 
specified in the bottom four cells of Table 1, consider the second row first. In this row, the 𝑈  
payoff under the “Stay in city” column describes the utility obtained by the representative artist 
when he or she chooses to reside in one city and the representative engineer decides to reside in 
the other city. Now recall that 𝑇 = 𝐿 𝑛⁄  and that 𝐿 = 𝛽 𝑛 . Substituting the second of these 
two equations into the first gives 𝑇 = (𝛽 𝑛 ) 𝑛 = 𝛽⁄ . This explains why the tax term 𝑇  can be 
written as 𝛽  in the equation for 𝑈 . Similarly, the 𝑈  payoff under the “Move from city” column 
delineates the utility obtained by the representative artist when he or she and the representative 
engineer both choose to reside in the same city. In this case, because both representative members 
live in the same city, the supply of the LPG is the mean of the two preferred quantities. This 
explains why the tax term in the expression for 𝑈   is given by (𝛽 + 𝛽 ) 2.⁄  Finally, observe that 
since 𝐿 = 𝛽 𝑛 , we obtain 𝐿 = 2𝛽  and 𝐿 = 2𝛽 . Therefore, (𝐿 + 𝐿 ) 2⁄ ={2(𝛽 + 𝛽 )} 2⁄ = 𝛽 + 𝛽 . This last result explains why the concluding term in the expression 
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for 𝑈  is 𝛽 log (𝛽 + 𝛽 ) and not 𝛽 log {(𝛽 + 𝛽 ) 2}.⁄  A similar interpretation applies to the 
two payoffs in the third row of Table 1 except that these payoffs now refer to the representative 
engineer.  
 Moving on to the second or type II equilibrium, the four possible utilities accruing to the 
representative artist and to the engineer are shown in Table 2. To interpret these payoffs, let us,  
[Table 2 about here] 
once again, focus first on the second row of this Table. In this row, the 𝑈  payoff under the “Stay 
in city” column describes the utility obtained by the representative artist when he or she and the 
representative engineer both choose to live in one city. Similarly, the 𝑈  payoff under the “Move 
from city” column delineates the utility obtained by the representative artist when he or she decides 
to live in one city and, as a result, the representative engineer ends up living in the other city. A 
similar interpretation applies to the two payoffs in the third row of Table 2 except that these payoffs 
now refer to the representative engineer.  
 After observing the eight payoffs accruing to the representative artist and the engineer in 
Tables 1 and 2 and the structure of our model, we deduce that an equilibrium will not exist if at 
least one representative creative class member (artist or engineer) wishes to move in the two 
possible types of equilibria. That said, let us concentrate on the type I equilibrium for the time 
being. With regard to this kind of equilibrium, observe that it is not possible to satisfy the 
inequalities 
 





   1 − + 𝛽 log(𝛽 + 𝛽 ) < 1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽 log (𝛽 )   (7) 
 
simultaneously. Why not? To answer this question, observe that if the inequalities in (6) and (7) 
hold simultaneously then an implication of (7) is that the inequality  
 
    < 𝛽 {log (𝛽 ) − log (𝛽 + 𝛽 )}   (8) 
 
is satisfied. However, since 𝛽 > 𝛽 > 0, some thought and the properties of the logarithm 
function together tell us that the left-hand-side (LHS) of (8) is positive but the RHS is negative. 
Therefore, the inequality in (8) clearly cannot hold which, in turn, means that the inequality in (7) 
also cannot hold.  
 The above finding informs us that the direction of the inequality sign in (7) needs to be 
flipped. Once this is done, the implication of the flipped inequality is that the utility from moving 
exceeds the utility from staying and therefore the representative engineer ought to move to the 
other city and live jointly with the representative artist. The inequality in (6) tells us that the utility 
from staying in a city for the representative artist (the LHS) is less than the utility from moving to 
the other city in which the representative engineer is resident (the RHS). Therefore, the 
representative artist also ought to move and live jointly with the representative engineer. Putting 
these two results together, we see that both representative creative class members would like to 
move from the posited equilibrium. Therefore, we cannot have a type I equilibrium in the model 
under study.  
 Having discussed the type I equilibrium, let us now focus on the type II equilibrium. In this 
case, consider the inequalities given by  
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   1 − + 𝛽 log(𝛽 + 𝛽 ) > 1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽 log(𝛽 ).   (10) 
 
Straightforward algebra reveals that the inequality in (10) always holds. Manipulating the 
individual terms in the inequality in (9) gives us the following parametric condition 
 
    > 1 + 2𝑙𝑜𝑔 1 + .      (11) 
 
 When the parametric condition in (11) is satisfied, the inequality in (9) holds for sure. In 
addition, since the inequality in (10) always holds, we can say that both the inequalities given in 
(9) and (10) hold when the above parametric condition is satisfied. From this discussion, we can 
deduce that when the parametric condition in (11) is satisfied, the representative artist will want to 
move away from a type I equilibrium (see (6), (9), and the payoffs in Tables 1 and 2) and the 
representative engineer will want to move away from a type II equilibrium (see (7), (10), and the 
payoffs in Tables 1 and 2). On the basis of this deduction we conclude that when the parametric 
condition given in (11) is satisfied, there is no equilibrium in the model under study. We now 
proceed to our final task in this chapter. This involves showing that if the representative artist and 
the engineer treat the LPG provision levels in each city as exogenous or given then an equilibrium 




5. Existence of an Equilibrium  
 In this case, the representative artist and the engineer both take the provision levels of the 
LPG or 𝐿  in each of the two cities as exogenous or given and not as something that either one of 
them can influence with their own actions. In this situation, the utilities obtained by the 
representative artist and the engineer will change and no longer be given by the payoffs specified 
in Tables 1 and 2. In particular, to analyze the type I equilibrium, the analog of Table 1 is now  
[Table 3 about here]  
given by Table 3.  
 Comparing Tables 1 and 3, we see that the payoffs to the representative artist (𝑈 ) and to 
the representative engineer (𝑈 ) in the “Stay in city” column are unchanged in Tables 1 and 3. 
However, because the LPG provision levels are now treated as exogenous by the two 
representative creative class members, relative to Table 1, the payoffs (𝑈 ) and (𝑈 ) in the “Move 
from city” column in Table 3 do change.  
 Similarly, in the type II equilibrium, we observe that the payoffs to the representative artist (𝑈 ) and to the representative engineer (𝑈 ) in the “Stay in city” column are unchanged in both 
Tables 2 and 4. Even so, for the same reason as the one mentioned in the preceding paragraph,  
[Table 4 about here] 
relative to Table 2, the utilities (𝑈 ) and (𝑈 ) in the “Move from city” column in Table 4 are 
different. In this regard, note that the specification 𝑈 = 𝑈 = −∞ for the two utilities in this 
column makes sense because we are assuming that if there are no representative creative class 
members residing in a particular city then the level of the LPG provided in this city is zero.  
 Now, inspecting the payoffs in Table 4, it is straightforward to verify that both 
representative creative class members will want to stay in the city in a type II equilibrium and not 
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move. However, the same cannot be said about a type I equilibrium. Inspecting the four payoffs in 
Table 3, we see that we cannot make a definitive statement about whether a type I equilibrium will 
exist. This is because at least one representative creative class member may want to move from 
the city in a type I equilibrium. So, we have just demonstrated that in contrast to the situation 
examined in section 4, a type II equilibrium will always exist when the representative artist and 
the engineer take the provision levels of the LPG or 𝐿  in each of the two cities as exogenous or 
given. This concludes our analysis of the existence of an equilibrium in models of LPG use by 
cities to draw in the creative class.  
6. Conclusions 
 In this chapter, we examined a stylized model of competition between two cities that used 
a LPG to draw in members of the creative class. The creative class consisted of artists and 
engineers and we analyzed the behavior of a representative artist and an engineer. The amount of 
the LPG provided in each city was determined by majority voting of the two representative creative 
class members. If both representative members chose to live in the same city then the LPG 
provided was the average of the preferred quantities of the two members. In this setting, we 
performed three tasks. First, we ascertained the preferred quantity of the LPG for the representative 
artist and the engineer. Second, assuming that the representative artist and the engineer accurately 
predicted the outcome of living in a specific city, we described a scenario in which there was no 
equilibrium in our model. Finally, we demonstrated that if the representative artist and the engineer 
treated the LPG provision levels in each city as exogenous then a type II equilibrium existed in the 
model.  
 The analysis conducted in this chapter can be extended in a number of different directions. 
In what follows, we suggest four possible extensions. First, instead of using quasi-linear utility 
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functions to describe the payoffs obtained by the two representative creative class members, it 
would be useful to study the equilibrium existence question with general utility functions that are 
both increasing and concave in their arguments. Second, since the decision about which city to 
live in is typically made on more than one occasion in a creative class member’s lifetime, it would 
be useful to analyze a multi-period game between representative creative class members and an 
apposite city authority where it is possible to change a member’s residence decision at different 
points in time. Third, it would be useful to explore the extent to which cities benefit by drawing in 
and retaining diverse sets of people within the creative class as opposed to specific subsets such 
as artists or engineers only. Finally, it would be helpful to study the equilibrium existence question 
of this chapter in a setting in which city authorities are able to draw in and hold on to members of 
the creative class with an expanded set of policies that includes LPGs as one particular policy. 
Studies that analyze these aspects of the underlying problem will provide additional insights into 
the range of circumstances in which equilibria exist in models of interactions between creative 
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